Thomas Hobbes and the Invented Tradition of Positivism: Reflections on Language, Power, and Essentialism by Boyle, James
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POSITIVISM: REFLECTIONS ON LANGUAGE, POWER, 
AND ESSENTIALISM 
JAMES BOYLEt 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an essay about the legal theory of Thomas Hobbes and 
about the things that are revealed when one compares Hobbes's ideas 
with the main line of legal positivism. Hobbes occupies a paradoxical 
position in traditional jurisprudence-revered but frequently over-
looked, hailed as a precursor but not as a founder, and used alternately 
as a bogeyman and an illustration of the difference between political 
and legal theory. If one actually looks at Hobbes's works, rather than 
footnoting them, cite unseen, one finds a rich stewpot of ideas; great 
dollops of wisdom about language, interpretation, power, legitimacy, 
epistemology, definition, scholasticism, human nature, and law. Of 
course, Hobbes has never been ignored. He still plays Mutt to Locke's 
Jeff in college courses in political theory. But at a time when legal 
theorists are rediscovering the fact that there is no bright line separat-
ing legal from political theory, that questions of legitimacy may resolve 
themselves into questions of epistemology, and that language and power 
are inextricably connected, Hobbes's work deserves rereading, if only to 
see how legal positivism defines its own margins. 
The title of this essay is taken from a bookl that describes some of 
the most remarkable examples of the manufacturing of tradition-the 
creation of myths that are then projected back into history. I want to 
suggest that something of the sort has happened with positivist legal 
philosophy. Of course, it would be ridiculous to suggest that positivism 
is as much an invented tradition as, for example, the Indian ceremonies 
that actually came from the British preconceptions about what a "na-
tive ceremony" should look like.2 We can all go back to the great texts 
and find what seem to be undeveloped and unsophisticated precursors 
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1 THE INVENTION OF TRADmON (E. Hobsbawm & T. Ranger eds. 1983). 
I See Cohn, Representing Authority in Victorian India, in id. at 165, 165-78, 
182-83. 
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of the positivist position. But that is intellectual history as seen through 
our end of the telescope. If the history had been a little different, we 
might be going back to demonstrate that all of the great theorists were 
fumbling their way toward a truth-community theory of law.s The pre-
cursors for that are there too; they are part of the material that we 
literally (and literarily) marginalize in our construction of the positivist 
lineage.~ 
In an earlier article/I I claimed that all definitional debates were 
fuelled by a common fixation and that they, in turn, fuelled a repeating 
pattern of arguments and evasions. Once identified, this pattern can be 
used either to manipulate or to unravel the definitional question, 
whether one is defining science, law, or false imprisonment.6 In this 
Article, I will further develop these ideas within the context of positivist 
legal philosophy. My thesis is that legal positivism best can be under-
stood as an example of this kind of argumentative pattern. The in-
vented history of positivism turns out to be the process by which theo-
rists sacrificed most of the meaning in their canonical texts to the 
maintenance of the definitional project. The idea is probably too com-
plicated to be developed properly in an introduction, but a skeletal ver-
sion runs something like this: 
(1) One can go a long way (fudge, fudge) with the pragmatist idea 
that definitional action should be guided by a purpose.? That is to say, 
8 That is, the theory that the truth of a proposition-whether about the definition 
of law or the correct decision in some particular case-depends on its acceptance within 
the relevant professional community. The general trend toward truth-community the-
ory is usually illustrated (perhaps unfairly) by T. KUHN, THE STRUGrURE OF SCIEN-
TIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). See also Boyle, The Politics of Reason, 133 U. PA 
L. REv. 685, 730 n.141 (1985) for an inelegant footnote summary. 
, I have not tried terribly hard, but presumably one could see Holmes and Coke 
as stressing the importance of a truth community. See Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. 
Rep. 64, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1608) ("artificial Reason [attained by] 
long study and experience"); O.W. HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED 
LEGAL PAPERS 167, 173 (1920) ("prophecies of what the court will do in fact. . . are 
what I mean by the law"). Seen in this light, the legal community becomes the final 
arbiter of both methodology and of the ultimate truth of propositions. Of course, such a 
reading may seem fairly silly, but it is much more sensible than some of the positivist 
readings that I am going to discuss. 
II Boyle, Ideals and Things, 26 HARv. INT'L L.J. 327 (1985); see also J. Boyle, 
Critical Jurisprudence (rev. ed. Feb. 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with the 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review) [hereinafter Critical Jurisprudence] (general 
investigation of the recurring patterns of circular argument produced by attempts to 
find true meaning of legal terms). 
8 See Critical Jurisprudence, supra note 5, at 2. 
'1 A definition of law is useful or useless. It is not true or false, any 
more than a New Year's resolutioI\ or an insurance policy. A defi-
nition is in fact a type of insurance against certain risks of confu-
sion. It cannot, any more than can a commercial insurance policy, 
eliminate all risks. 
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one can either dissolve or resolve a definitional question by asking, 
"Why do you want to know?" 
(2) The great positivists were, implicitly or explicitly, engaged in 
definitional actions that were deeply infused with purpose. For exam-
ple, Hobbes was shoring up the power of a centralized state by appear-
ing to deduce, from the very definition of law, the need to subordinate 
all forms of normative authority to the power of the sovereign. 
(3) Although they may have said that they were defining law in 
the abstract, the great positivists' work makes more sense (to me) if 
read in the light of those purposes. 
(4) But in order to make legal positivism a venerable tradition we 
have to ignore those different purposes, gather a set of texts together, 
and claim that there is a common theme weaving its way down the 
centuries toward us. This has the bizarre effect of making Austin and 
Hobbes seem "essentially similar," but even more strangely, it makes 
H.L.A. Hart a more sophisticated thinker than Hobbes.8 
So what is positivism? Like any invented tradition, positivism is 
most easily described by reference to what it is not. Positivists are the 
ones who have denied, minimized, or pooh-poohed the role of morality 
or religion in the "concept of law" and who have correspondingly 
stressed the role of the state and its authorized organs.9 Austin provides 
perhaps the classic positivist argument: "The existence of a law is one 
thing; its merit or demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one 
.enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, 
is a different enquiry."lo By repeating this slogan often enough, and by 
relying on one of the many contradictory, implicit definitions of law 
shared by those who have had legal training,!1 the positivists have ef-
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 
809, 835-36 (1935). 
Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object.-And 
you really get such a queer connexion when the philosopher tries to bring 
out the relation between name and thing by staring at an object in front of 
him and repeating a name or even the word "this" innumerable times. For 
philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday. 
L. WrrrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 19 (1958). For further explana-
tion, see infra note 11. 
8 And the standing-on-the-shoulders-of-giants line does not work, unless you can 
stand on their shoulders and do things they would think are silly. 
• See, e.g., J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 
(H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); H. KELsEN, 
PuRE THEORY OF LAW (1967) (1978 reprint). 
10 J. AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 184. 
11 By this I mean only that a lawyer is likely to have different implicit "defini-
tions" of law depending on whether she is advising a client, explaining law to a civics 
class, or arguing a case. The first probably would depend more on predictions of offi-
cial behavior, the second might be a positivist account of the hierarchy of power-confer-
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fectively swept the field of their natural law foes. The positivist move-
ment is now going through a relatively typical version of academic suc-
cess-lacking the spice of a fight that was always more imaginary than 
real, its protagonists (almost everyone who works in traditional juris-
prudence) have fallen to quarrelling amongst themselves about the 
proper placement of "posts" and "neos,"12 to writing articles that do 
little more than change a word or two in the dominant definitions,1s 
and, of course, to rebuilding natural law in effigy, so that they can 
alternately burn it (in its old form) and praise it (in its new, 
Dworkinian, form).14 What are all of these verbal alarums, excursions, 
and ambuscades about? 
I do not see positivism as a grand strain of thought spanning the 
centuries, now being perfected by a disciplined and clear sighted cadre 
of theorists. Rather, I believe that the drive to "find" positivism and 
natural law as a continuing tension running through the ages has led 
jurisprudes to an impoverished conception of each side of the tension.16 
ring and power-applying norms in a Western legal system, and the last might be a 
relatively rich description of the sources, modes of argument and analogies acceptable at 
a particular historical moment within the legal profession. Many jurisprudential de-
bates consist of arguments about which is really the "correct" definition of law. Because 
those same debates lack any explicit discussion of why a particular purpose should be 
considered as forever the most fundamental, they are doomed to an erudite circularity. 
This is exactly the mistake that Wittgenstein is describing in the quote cited earlier. See 
supra note 7; see also W.H. AUDEN, Law like Love, in COLLECTED POEMS 208 (E. 
Mendelson ed. 1976). 
12 See, e.g., Summers, The New AnalyticalJurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 861, 862-
63 (1969) (distinguishing "old" analytical jurists such as Austin, Gray, Hohfeld, and 
Kocourek from "new" jurists such as Hart, Williams, Hughes, Dworkin, Fried, Mor-
ris, and Wasserstrom). 
18 Unfortunately, I do not have the space here to deal with the complicated confes-
sion and avoidance mechanisms used by contemporary jurisprudes to deal with the 
charge that they are engaged in a purely definitionalist enterprise. Those mechanisms 
are to be subject of another article. See Boyle, Critical Jurisprudence, supra note 5. For 
my present purposes, it is enough to note that jurisprudes claim that they are engaged 
in no mere semantic dispute, but instead are identifying the prerequisites for law, or 
the minimum criteria necessary to call something "law," or that they are clarifying the 
concept of law by bringing out its most fundamental components. It is my claim-and I 
recognize that at this point it is no more than a claim-that the "prerequisites," "crite-
ria," and "fundamental components" are all, in fact, resurrections of the essentialist 
project under another name. I offer the text accompanying notes 51-72 infra as a par-
tial defense of the idea that positivism has gone wrong and offer H.L.A. HART, THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW, supra note 9 and J. RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 
(1970) as paradigmatic examples of the resurrected, chastened definitionalism. 
14 See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977) (an argument for 
"principled" decisionmaking based on the "political rights" that, somewhat mysteri-
ously, underpin the legal system). But see R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [here-
inafter LAW'S EMPIRE] (naturalistic political ,rights fade out, interpretive integrity fades 
in). 
16 I trust that the picture of analytic jurisprudence as being fixated on the tension 
between positivism and natural law is so obvious as to be boringly unobjectionable. 
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Both the positivist and the natural law strands need to be made su-
premely vague if they are to be "discovered" in every era, and in every 
academic debate. Thus, the paradigmatic' examples of each philosophy 
get cut off from the political, epistemological, and rhetorical purposes 
which they served. (Hobbes and H.L.A. Hart are really doing "the 
same thing"?) In fact, one of the ironic twists of an essentialist disci-
pline is that any attempt to provide a definition that does serve some 
concrete purpose will probably be seen as inferior, subjective, and par-
tial (meaning both limited and biased). The only thing, therefore, that 
could save the activity from circularity and dogmatism is seen instead as 
a corruption. "Well, he had a reason for defining law that way." 
In other words, the invented tradition of positivism does to legal 
theory what an individual positivist theory does to law. The individual 
theory reifies a definition of law by focusing on some supposedly essen-
tial quality (commands backed by threats, for example)16 and gives this 
particular definition a false universality by ignoring the question of 
what purpose it is to serve (counselling clients, questioning the legiti-
macy of the state, etc.). The tradition of positivism reifies the task of 
defining law, making it the central endeavor of legal theory. Thus posi-
tivism gives the task of definition a false universality by separating it 
from the very notion of purpose. As for Hobbes, I may be right or 
wrong about the way that his work is presented in contemporary clas-
ses in legal theory. But if one reads Hobbes's work one cannot help but 
-wonder how the later positivists managed to ignore both his political 
theory and his critique of essences, as they constructed a conceptual 
jurisprudence that would have been the envy of the "deceived, or de-
ceiving Schoolemen"l'1 whom Hobbes loved to bait. 
A note on methodology. I had two fairly unattractive choices. 
First, I could rely on the general knowledge of my readers to supply 
the conventional legal and political insights into Hobbes's work, merely 
inserting the occasional comment when I thought we should collapse 
the boundary between the political theory and the jurisprudential inter-
pretation, or when we should reread Hobbes in the light of recent dis-
putes about legal interpretation. Alternatively, I could go into more de-
tail, thus running the risk that I would often be repeating well-known 
Because this is a kind of unspoken structure to the discipline it is best seen in the 
presentation of jurisprudence for "external" consumption. See, e.g., Hughes, The Con-
cep~ of Law, 3 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS : STUDIES OF SELECTED 
PIvOTAL IDEAS 1-6 (1973) (distinction emerges in 5th century B.C. and continues to 
be source of debate). 
Ie See J. AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 13-15. 
17 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 99 (C.B. MacPherson ed. 1968) [hereinafter 
LEVIATHAN). 
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truths. I have chosen the second risk for three reasons: (1) I hope to 
make the piece more accessible (even if less impressive); (2) A close 
reading shows that Hobbes's legal theory compares favorably with 
those of the subsequent positivist theorists; and (3) I think that one of 
the most interesting things about Hobbes is the way that he uses his 
definitional argument for political ends. Few people have wielded the 
fallacy of reification to greater effect. To understand what he does, one 
must go line by line through the familiar text of Hobbes's definition of 
law in the Leviathan. Taking this section in Leviathan as my text, I 
want not only to sketch the connections that Hobbes saw between defi-
nition, interpretation, and the theory of law and state, but also to show 
the dangerous power of the definitional argument in the hands of a 
master. I also want to demonstrate how an analysis of Hobbes's work 
leads to an understanding of the defects of the positivist enterprise. 
All but one of the quotes that follow come from the pen of the 
most charming freeloader to have left us a memoir: John Aubrey, good 
friend of Thomas Hobbes and lover of wine, learning, poetry, and gos-
sip. This is not an intellectual biography of Hobbes, and I will be mak-
ing only occasional further use of Aubrey'S Brief Lives. But as you read 
what follows, think occasionally of the Thomas Hobbes whose school-
mates called him "Crowe," whose eyes shone when he was "in dis-
course," who threatened from his sickbed to detect the "cheates" of the 
churchmen, who played tennis when he was seventy-five, who wrote 
love poetry when he was ninety, and who provided us with the com-
ment that out-Wittgensteins Wittgenstein: "[W]ords are wise mens 
counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the mony of 
fooles."l8 
18 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 106. 
1987] THOMAS HOBBES AND POSITIVISM 
THOMAS HOBBES 
The old vicar Hobs [Hobbes's father] was a good Fel-
low and had been at cards all Saturday night, and at 
church in his sleep he cries out Trafells [clubs] is 
troumps.19 
[I]n matter of Government, when nothing else is turn'd 
up, Clubs are Trumps.20 
Thomas, the Father, had an elder Brother whose 
name was Francis, a wealthy man, and has been Alder-
man of the Borough; by Profession a Glover, which is a 
great Trade here, and in times past much greater. 
(Shall I expresse or conceale this glover? The philoso-
pher would acknowledge it.)21 
The day of his Birth was April the fifth, Anno 
Domini 1588, on a Fryday morning, which that yeare 
was Good Fryday. His mother fell in labour with him 
upon the fright of the Invasion of the Spaniards.22 
When he was a Boy he was playsome enough, but 
withall he had even then a contemplative Melancholi-
nesse; he would gett him into a corner, and learn his 
Lesson by heart presently [at once]. His haire was 
black, and his schoolfellows were wont to call him 
Crowe. 28 
He had a good eie, and that of a hazell colour, 
which was full of Life and Spirit, even to the last. 
When he was earnest in discourse, there shone (as it 
were) a bright live-coale within it.24 
When Mr. T. Hobbes was sick in France, the 
Divines came to him and tormented him (both Roman 
Catholic, Church of England, and Geneva). Sayd he to 
them, Let me alone, or els I will detect all your Cheates 
1. J. AUBREY, AUBREY'S BRIEF LIVES 148 (D.L. Dick ed. 1958). 
389 
10 T. HOBBES, OJ Punishments, in A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A PHILOSOPHER & A 
STUDENT OF THE COMMON LAWS OF ENGLAND 140, 140 U. Cropseyed. 1971) 
11 J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 148. 
II ld. at 147. 
sa ld. at 148-49. 
14 !d. at 154. 
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from Aaron to yourselves.211 
Besides his dayly Walking, he did twice or thrice a 
yeare play at Tennis (at about 75 he did it) then went 
to bed there and was well rubbed.26 
I have heard him inveigh much against the Cruel-
tie of Moyses for putting so many thousands to the 
Sword for Bowing to the Golden Calf.27 
He fell sick about the middle of October 1679 
. . . . He seemed . . . to dye rather for want of the 
Fuell of Life (which was spent in him) and meer weak-
nesse and decay, then by the power of his disease 
28 
I. THE CASE FOR HOBBES'S STATUS AS A POSITIVIST 
In the next two sections I make several claims. I claim that Hob-
bes is doing something more interesting (even if sometimes more disa-
greeable) than the positivist theorists who come after him and that if 
we analyze his work it will help us to understand the defects of the 
positivist enterprise. I also claim that Hobbes has been misunderstood, 
undervalued, and even trivialized because his picture of law shows legal 
interpretation, politics, and epistemology to be inseparable and this rep-
resents a challenge to the invented tradition of positivism. Before I 
reach these claims, I must show that Hobbes looks like a positivist; I 
have to demonstrate that he is arguably within the genre before I can 
argue that he transcends it. Is Hobbes ignored by positivists because he 
is not in fact a positivist? We must be more specific. 
Why does H.L.A. Hart say, "[Austin's] work ... established the 
study of jurisprudence in England,"29 and why does Hart devote a sub-
stantial part of his Concept of Law to arguing with Austin and not 
Hobbes ?80 Why does the standard jurisprudence course feature Dwor-
kin, Raz, Hart, Kelsen, and Austin as major players, relegating Hobbes 
to the introductory parade of venerable, but marginal, jurisprudes ?81 
25 Id. at 156. 
28 Id. at 155. 
27 Id. at 157. 
28 Id. at 158-59. 
29 Hart, Editor's Introduction to J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE 
DETERMINED at xvi (1954). 
80 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 18-70. 
81 See, e.g., J. FEINBERG & H. GROSS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (2d ed. 1980) Gu-
risprudence textbook, Hobbes not even discussed); LORD LLOYD OF HAMPSTEAD & 
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Hobbes is obviously better known than Austin as a political theorist, 
and he is obviously not ignored within positivist legal theory. But why 
is he so often relegated to the position of one of the many ancestors of 
the tradition, those who swept the stage for Austin to perform on? Is 
his method of inquiry somehow outside the tradition of the "What is 
Law" theorists? Is it that he is not engaged in a proper positivist search 
for the essence of law, or that he does not define law in positivist 
terms? Let us see. 
In the first paragraph of his chapter "Of Civill Lawes" in the 
Leviathan, Hobbes tells us that "Civill Law" is sometimes used to re-
fer to the received Roman law: "But that is not what I intend to speak 
of here; my designe being not to shew what is Law here, and there; but 
what is Law; as Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and divers others have done, 
without taking upon them the profession of the study of the Law."s2 
Surely, one could not ask for a statement that is more in the main-
stream of the definitional approach. Is it that Hobbes's definition itself 
is somehow lacking in terms of its positivist credentials? 
And first it is manifest, that Law in generall, is not 
Counsell, but Command; nor a Command of any man to any 
man; but only of him, whose Command is addressed to one 
formerly obliged to obey him. And as for Civill Law, it ad-
deth only the name of the person Commanding, which is 
Persona Civitatis, the Person of the Commonwealth. 
Which considered, I define Civill Law in this manner. 
CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the 
Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, 
or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the 
Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is 
contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule. ss 
This obviously fits beautifully into the positivist tradition. Hobbes 
is engaged in an abstract attempt to define law, and he does so in terms 
of the command of the sovereign. He even has a little something about 
prior obligation to obey, which, as we know from the rest of Hobbes's 
book, is based on a theory of self-interest in a hypothetical and su-
premely "rational" covenant to subject oneself to a supreme sovereign.Sf 
At the very end of this definitional passage it might have looked as 
M. FREEMAN, LLOYD's INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE (5th ed. 1985) (Hobbes 
mentioned once in chapter on classical English positivism). 
3S LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 311-312. 
as Id. at 312. 
M See id. at 223-28. 
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though Hobbes was straying into natural law ("for the Distinction of 
Right and Wrong"). But the final clause makes it clear that right and 
wrong are actually functions of the law. 
So far Hobbes appears to be firmly within the positivist tradition. 
The standard positivist/natural law oppositions are positive law versus 
morality, state versus church, profane versus transcendental, command 
versus counsel, threats versus internalized obligation, and Will versus 
Reason. Positivists generally stress the left-hand side of each opposition. 
(Although any given positivist theorist appears to be allowed one term 
from the right-hand side of the table, to distinguish that theorist's the-
ory from all the others, if nothing else.) Hobbes has already defined 
law in terms of the command of the sovereign, he defines commands as 
self-interested acts of will,sCI and in one lovely passage he flips the 
traditional natural law idea of "law as reason" onto its head. Please 
read the passage that follows not only as an attack on the natural law 
conception, but also as an interpretive theory of law. 
That Law can never be against Reason, our Lawyers 
are agreed; and that not the Letter, (that is, every construc-
tion of it,) but that which is according to the Intention of the 
Legislator, is the Law. And it is true: but the doubt is, of 
whose Reason it is, that shall be received for Law. It is not 
meant of any private Reason; for then there would be as 
much contradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles; 
nor yet, (as Sr. Ed. Coke makes it,) an Artificiall perfection 
of Reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experi-
ence, (as his was.) For it is possible long study may encrease, 
and confirm erroneous Sentences: and where men build on 
false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruine: 
and of those that study, and observe with equall time, and 
diligence, the reasons and resolutions are, and must remain 
discordant: and therefore it is not that Juris prudentia, or 
wisedome of subordinate Judges; but the Reason of this our 
Artificiall Man the Common-wealth, and his Command, 
that maketh Law .... The subordinate Judge, ought to 
have regard to the reason, which moved his Soveraign to 
make such Law, that his Sentence may be according there-
, unto; which then is his Soveraigns Sentence; otherwise it is 
his own, and an unjust one.S6 
36 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 303. 
a8 Id. at 316-17. 
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I use this quotation to demonstrate Hobbes's partyline correctness, 
within the invented tradition, on the matter of the law as reason. 
"Whose reason?," asks Hobbes, the skeptical positivist. But the quota-
tion gives us another reason to recognize Hobbes as a foundational pos-
itivist-he offers a theory of interpretation, which taken together with 
his comments about psychology, the nature of words, and the legitima-
tion of the state, provides an edifice that is more sophisticated than is 
provided by Austin. (Or by Hart, Kelsen, or early Dworkin as far as I 
am concerned, but I realize that this is heresy.) I am going to argue 
that Hobbes's interpretive theory rejects the "rule of law" answer to 
the antinomy of freedom and order, and that this is one of the reasons 
why Hobbes is not given Austin's place as the foundational positivist. 
II. HOBBES'S THEORY OF INTERPRETATION MAKES HIM 
UNATTRACTIVE TO POSITIVISTS 
We must return to the quotation from Leviathan given on the pre-
vious page. One is tempted to be historicist and say that Hobbes is 300 
years ahead of the game. In this short paragraph, he deals with and 
disposes of most of the schools of legal theory that will come after him. 
He finds objectivity to be impossible and instead plumps for a kind of 
privileged secular subjectivity-the Sovereign as authoritative Subject. 
He does this, not because the sovereign can claim a superior insight 
into the moral universe, not because the purposes and ideas of the legis-
lator will always actually be clear or decipherable to the "subordinate 
Judge," but because the interpretation of the law must be final and 
authoritative. Let me support these rather intemperate assertions. 
In coming to his conclusion, Hobbes does a lightning run through 
the theories that will be applied to the problem in the next 300 years. 
He rejects the idea of self-revealing texts. "All Laws, written, and un-
written, have need of Interpretation ... [because of] the divers signifi-
cations of ... words."3'1 He rejects the idea that a professional speech 
community38 can acquire any meaningful degree of authoritative con-
sistency: recourse to "any private Reason" would lead to "as much con-
tradiction in the Lawes, as there is in the Schooles."39 The lawyer's 
claim to an "Artificiall perfection of Reason"4o gets similarly short 
37 Id. at 322. 
38 For the background to the idea of acquiring determinacy through speech-com-
munities, see S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980); T. KUHN, supra 
note 3; PARADIGMS AND REVOLUTIONS (G. Gutting ed. 1980); Critical Jurisprudence, 
supra note 5, at 2. 
38 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 316. 
40 Id. at 317. The actual quote, from Sir Edward Coke, concerns the "artificial 
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shrift. The "reason" that drives the law is going to have to be that of 
"the Artificial Man the Common-wealth."41 Of course, Hobbes wants 
deference to the sovereign, but he does not seem to imagine that the 
sovereign's will can always be discovered, or even that it always exists. 
That is not the point. 
To [the Sovereign] therefore there can not be any knot in the 
Law, insoluble; either by finding out the ends, to undoe it 
by; or else by making what ends he will, (as Alexander did 
with his sword in the Gordian knot,) by the Legislative 
power; which no other Interpreter can doe.42 
Legal interpretation will not, and cannot, be "object-ive"; it must come 
from some unanswerably authoritative Subject. 
Most political and legal philosophers have tried to edge away from 
this conclusion. Our philosophical tradition has attempted to reconcile 
the antinomy of freedom and order by postulating "a rule of laws and 
not men." We can have authority without personal domination if we 
have democracy and if legal interpretation is "objective"; the law comes 
from within the fetishized textual objects rather than from anyone's 
willful decision. But Hobbes, like Marx and Feuerbach, is critical of 
the pretense that a desired quality is somehow inherently present in an 
external object.43 For Hobbes, law is about power, so when you give 
him the happy naturalistic conceit that it can never be against reason, 
he turns the whole meaning of the phrase on its head by agreeing, and 
then saying, "Whose Reason ?"44 
Reason" of the law, which "is an Act which requires long Study and Experience, 
before that a Man can attain to the Cognizance of it." Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Co. 
Rep. 64, 65, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 1343 (K.B. 1608). I cannot but add Aubrey's com-
ment on Coke: "He will play with his Case as a Cat would with a mouse and be so 
fulsomely Pedantique that a Schoole boy would nauseate it. But when he comes to 
matter of Lawe, all acknowledge him to be admirable." J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 
68. Despite his present status as the lawyer's hero, Coke does not seem to have been the 
most lovable of men. After his death his wife had this to say. "We shall never see his 
like again, praises be to God." B.M. Harl. Ms. 7193, fol. 16, quoted in S. THORNE, 
SIR EDWARD COKE, 1552-1952, at 4 (1957) (Selden Society Lecture of March 17, 
1952). It is interesting to note that the authoritarian Hobbes seems to have been quite 
delightful. 
n LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 317. 
42 [d. at 322. 
48 See, e.g., L. FEUERBACH, THE ESSENCE OF CHRISTIANITY (M. Evans trans. 
2d ed. 1854); Marx, Estranged Labour, in THE MARX-ENGELS READER 56 (R. 
Tucker ed. 1972). Feuerbach believed that "God" was a metaphor for human potential. 
Marx believed that production under capitalism is objectified so that the object seems to 
rule the worker and not vice-versa. In both cases a choice-one religious, one economic, 
political, and systemic-is denied. I think that Hobbes saw a total faith in rules as 
involving the same pattern of projection, denial, and false necessity. 
44 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 316. 
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Is it because of this refusal to accept an answer that would fit 
within the mainstream of legal and social theory that Hobbes was 
passed over as the real parent of positivism? Is this the reason the role 
went to Austin? There has certainly been criticism of Hobbes's theory 
of interpretation. For example, in the context of a discussion of Sir 
Matthew Hale's response to Hobbes's ideas, Professor Gray claims 
Hobbes makes two errors: "[t]he fallacy of excessive realism"4!, and 
"[t]he compensating fallacy of excessive faith in natural law adjudica-
tion.""6 According to Gray, Hobbes 
was aware that judges do not and cannot settle cases merely 
by applying rules given them by the legislature or by tradi-
tion, without reference to the reasonableness of the result. 
He concluded that the reasonableness of the result according 
to the judges' lights is the only thing that judges can or do 
really inquire into."7 
But despite the criticism, and despite the fact that it would fit a 
great many of my own theoretical prejudices to do so, I do not feel I 
can argue that this is the main reason the positivists have rejected Hob-
bes. The authoritarian antiliberalism of Hobbes's interpretive jurispru-
dence has probably played a part in making him a sort of disreputable 
ancestor, but I think that there is an even stronger set of reasons for his 
venerable, but marginal, status. By going through these reasons I hope 
to develop my critique of the invented tradition of positivism and at the 
same time to deepen our understanding of Hobbes as a legal 
philosopher. 
I should note here that the arguments that follow are not depen-
dent on the idea that Hobbes's theories have been distorted and under-
rated by the positivist tradition. I believe they have been, but the same 
information can provide an answer to the question, "What is interest-
ing about Hobbes's argumentative method and his legal theory?" as 
well as to the question "Why has Hobbes been marginalized?" 
45 Gray, Editor's Introduction to SIR MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE 
COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND, at xxxii-xxxiii (1971). 
48 Id. at xxxiii. 
47 /d. at xxxii-xxxiii. Sheldon Wolin makes a more general observation that might 
bear on the realist "feel" of Hobbes's work. "Thus Machiavelli, Luther, and Calvin 
might pray to different gods, and Hobbes pray to none at all, yet all four were at one in 
their response to chaos: chaos was the material of creativity, not a cause for resigna-
tion." S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION 243 (1960) (emphasis added). This may pro-
vide yet another reason to think that Hobbes has a message for post-realist lawyers. It 
would be hard to find a more compressed statement of the peculiar existential and 
epistemological transformation brought about by first-year law school. 
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III. THE THEORETICAL RICHNESS OF HOBBES'S WORK IS AN 
IMPLICIT CHALLENGE TO THE STERILITY AND CIRCULARITY OF 
POSITIVIST DEFINITIONS 
I argued above that the invented tradition of positivism does to 
jurisprudence what individual positivist theories do to law. The individ-
ual positivist theory puts forward an objectified definition of law, de-
taches it from any particular purpose, and thus conveys upon it a false 
universality. The tradition of positivism does the same thing on the 
meta-level; it objectifies the task of definition itself, detaching it from 
the very notion of purpose. Consequently, many jurisprudence scholars 
do not believe that they are defining law to serve some hidden agenda. 
They honestly believe they can define law in the abstract, and thus 
their work is convincing because of the very absence of purpose-read 
"lack of bias" -that makes it so empty. Hobbes, on the other hand, has 
a very explicit purpose: to tie the concept of law into a sci.ence of polit-
ics.4s Unlike Hart, Hobbes does not imagine that it is possible to un-
derstand someone's obligation to obey the state by analyzing, in the 
abstract, the conceptual structure of law.49 Instead of making pretty 
verbal distinctions between "being obliged" and "having an obliga-
tion,"lio Hobbes starts from a set of "compositive-resolutive" concep-
tions of human nature, power, and the state, which, when put together, 
sound suspiciously similar to (if more interesting than) modern public 
choice theory. From these, he builds his idea of the nature of law. 
What do modern jurisprudes think of his project? 
The imperative conception of law emerged in modern 
times concurrently with the development of the modern state. 
The English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, an original 
thinker but not a lawyer nor even primarily interested in 
legal philosophy, came close to the imperative conception 
when he said: "Law properly is the word of him that by 
right hath command over others." 
The context of this passage shows that Hobbes included 
political authority and political sanction (implied in "com-
mand") in his conception. "By right," however, introduces a 
qualification, that the sovereign's right to command rests 
48 See LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 311-12. 
49 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 77-96. Hart states, for example, that "most 
of the features of law which have proved most perplexing . . . can best be rendered 
clear, if these two types of rules [primary and secondary rules) and the interplay be-
tween them are understood." [d. at 79. 
50 See id. at 80. 
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upon the social contract which is presupposed in the estab-
lishment of a sovereign. The imperative conception of law 
could not emerge until the question of the political justifica-
tion of the state, or of sovereign power, was distinguished 
from the question, by what criteria does one determine, in a 
modern state, that a particular thing is or is not a part of 
the law of that state?51 
397 
In other words, Hobbes's jurisprudence is still cluttered up with 
an attempt to explore the political justification of the state. The "true" 
positivist, imperative theory cannot come into existence until the defini-
tion has been purged of any such task. You may be tempted to respond 
that, even if it is not as theoretically exciting as Hobbes's project, it is 
nevertheless valuable and worthwhile to work out some method of iden-
tifying what is or is not law in a particular state. I quite agree, but if 
that is Patterson's justification for the imperative (Le., the positivist 
command) theory of law, then he seems to be wide of the mark. 
Let us assume that Patterson wants a noncircular definition for 
the "law of the state" (although that is by no means clear). The content 
of such a definition will obviously change depending on his purpose in 
asking for it. For advising a client, he might want a definition focusing 
on the prediction of judges', or other officials', behavior.52 For con-
structing a legal argument, he might want a list of the documents and 
patterns of behavior that were considered by the legal profession of that 
time and place to be "authoritative sources" and an explanation of the 
modes of argument and the analogies and metaphors that were thought 
to be persuasive in that particular period.58 As a judge, he might want 
a little of the latter, combined with a normative theory of the good, or a 
formal,M or realist,55 or Dworkinian,56 or Posnerian57 theory about ob-
51 E. PA"ITERSON, JURISPRUDENCE: MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 83-84 (1953) 
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see also J. FINCH, INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
THEORY 34 (3d ed. 1979) (describing Hobbes as a natural law philosopher with a 
"patently political motive in using natural law to justify the necessity of an absolute 
ruler"). Despite the positivist "feel" of Hobbes's definition, and the fact that he makes 
natural law dependent on the existence of the state, Finch feels Hobbes must be la-
belled as a natural law philosopher. Why? Perhaps one of the reasons is that Hobbes 
had an explicit "normative" element in his theory-a purpose behind his defini-
tion-and positivists are supposed to eschew such luxuries. 
51 See, e.g., D.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167-69 (1921). This is 
not to say that Holmes or any of the following authors saw their theories of law in the 
context I present them here. It is to say that the theories "make sense" in some intui-
tive, existential way within that context. 
5S See, e.g., Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Conscious-
ness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, in 3 REs. IN L. & 
Soc. 3, 9-17 (1980). 
54 Formalist pronouncements are even more scarce than formalist practices. I con-
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jectivity, decisionmaking, and the proper limits of the judicial role. As a 
citizen, he might also want to know when state force was likely to be 
applied in support of a particular claim (an inquiry that might and 
might not depend on predictions of judges' behavior). More probably 
he would, like all of us, rely on all of these "definitions," sometimes 
sequentially and sometimes all together. How would a (purified, im-
perative) definition such as "law is the primary norm, which stipulates 
the sanction,"118 or a "union of primary and secondary rules,"119 help 
him in any of these attempts to find what is and what is not the law of 
the state? Is there something that they would help him to do that Hob-
bes's theory, the lawyer's rule of thumb, or a first-year class in political 
theory would not do as well, or better? Would they help him do any-
thing at all? 
This is the secret at the heart of the invented tradition of positiv-
ism. By dispensing with the very notion of purpose, positivist theorists 
have carved out an unenviable territory for themselves. What is the 
positivist's answer to the question, "What is law?" It is not a political 
and legal theory such as Hobbes's, which puts forward an argument as 
to the conditions under which state power is justified and deduces a 
legal theory from the kind of compact that rational beings would ac-
cept. It is not a historical legal theory that describes the legal conscious-
ness at some particular time or in some particular place. It is not a 
predictive theory that describes what judges and officials are likely to 
do. It is not an emancipatory theory that tries to expose the fetishism of 
the market,60 or the influence of the economic substructure,61 or the 
effects of racism or sexism on courts, or concepts, or patterns of 
thought.62 Nor is it a normative theory that puts forward arguments 
about what we should do based on Rawlsian ethics,63 or Posnerian effi-
tinue to regard H.L.A. Hart's idea of core and penumbral meanings of words as the 
foundation of a "loosened-up" formalism. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 121-32; 
Boyle, supra note 3, at 708-13. 
BB See K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 
(1960). ' 
B8 See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 14. 
B7 See R. POSNER, EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). 
B8 H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 61 (1945). 
B9 H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 77. 
80 See Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the Fetishism 
of Commodities, 34 AM. U.L. REv. 939 (1985). 
81 See H. COLUNS, MARXISM AND LAW (1984). 
82 See, e.g., Burns, Law a~d Race in America, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 89 (D. 
Kairys ed. 1982); Freeman, Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review, in id. at 96; 
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurispru-
dence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983). 
88 See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). Ed Baker has produced the best 
examples of this general type of theory. See Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective 
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ciency,64 or Sartrean contingency.6!> So what is it? 
To answer this question we must look at what positivists think 
that they are doing. Positivists are, first and foremost, conceptualists. 
Their task is implicitly structured by two assumptions: first, that the 
highest form of knowledge about law can be gained through definition, 
and second, that the test of such a definition will be its ability to distin-
guish law from, or relate law to, those phenomena that are concep-
tually rather than ideologically, behaviorally, or professionally similar. 
Thus, positivist definitions are more or less explicitly designed to sepa-
rate law from other normative systems (morals, religion), on the one 
hand, and threats or commands on the other.66 Both these assumptions 
seem very implausible to me, for practical, methodological, and episte-
mological reasons. Definitional activity is practically an invitation for 
language to go on holiday.6? Even if it were not, the focus on concep-
tual definition is unwarranted and on the few occasions when we are 
looking for conceptual maps of law, the positivist ones are of little use. 
But how did the positivists themselves see these apparently crippling 
defects in their own work? 
Patterson may provide us with an answer. Earlier I quoted his 
comment that Hobbes "came close to" the imperative conception of law, 
but that his ideas still contained reference to "the question of the politi-
cal justification of the state."68 In a more thoroughly refined imperative 
theory this impurity has to be eliminated, or at least distinguished from 
the real task of positivism: defining law tout seul. Austin's work is 
purer, but even Austin's theory contains some references to political 
reality (e.g., his theory of sovereignty).69 Patterson notes that Kelsen 
dispenses even with this, a move that "simplifies the Austinian concep-
tion of law and makes sharper the division between the political philos-
ophy of the state and jurisprudence (Kelsen's legal science)."?O This 
actually seems like a good thing within the positivist/imperative 
tradition: 
To many of Austin's followers and to lawyers engaged in 
Choice Situations, 25 UCLA ·L. REV. 381 (1978); Baker, Outcome Equality or Equal-
ity of Respect, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 933 (1983); Baker, Property and Its Relation to 
Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (1986). 
64 See, e.g., Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 323 (1978). 
ea See, e.g., Gabel, Intention and Structure in Contractual Conditions: Outline 
of a Method Jor Critical Legal Theory, 61 MINN. L. REV. 601 (1977). 
ee See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9; H. KELsEN, supra note 9. 
87 See L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 7. 
ea See supra text accompanying note 51. 
ea See J. AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 191-361. 
70 E. PATTERSON, supra note 51, at 92. 
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their professional work Austin's conception of sovereignty is 
a mere excrescence, since they take the government of their 
state as something given and are not called upon, as lawyers, 
to determine whether people are in a habit of obedience to it. 
However, it seems unnecessary to purge the conception of 
positive law of all factual connections with the society for 
which it is established and maintained. 71 
To me, that last sentence sounds wistful rather than ironic. In any 
event, I think Patterson has put his finger on the criteria for good posi-
tivist theory. Pure positivism comes close to pure emptiness. On the one 
hand, it is determined to differentiate itself from predictive, normative, 
and critical theories of law-theories that might play a role in legal 
practice. On the other hand, it shies away from political theories that 
venture to suggest that you cannot give a purely conceptual explanatiori 
of the obligation to obey law. This leaves it with the sterile middle-
ground of "pure definition." No wonder Hobbes's theories are 
marginalized within the tradition. His theories are contaminated with 
such unimportant questions as human nature, the political justification 
of the state, the effect of one person's power on another-all of the 
things that the "sophisticated" positivists have managed to jettison. I 
hope that you see what I mean about Hobbes's ideas showing up the 
emptiness of the positivist tradition. 
IV. HOBBES'S THEORY Is A PARADIGMATIC EXAMPLE OF How 
TO USE DEFINITIONALISM FOR POLITICAL ENDS YET IT Is 
EPISTEMOLOGICALLY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM THE REST OF 
THE TRADITION 
When the Parliament sate that began in April 1640 and was 
dissolved in May following, and in which many pointes of 
the Regall Power, which were necessary for the Peace of the 
Kingdome and Safety of his Majestye's Person, were dis-
puted and denyed, Mr. Hobbes wrote a little Treatise in 
English, wherein he did sett-forth and demonstrate, that the 
sayd Powers and Rights were inseparably annexed to the 
Soveraignty, which soveraignty they did not then deny to be 
in the King; but it seemes understood not, or would not un-
derstand, that Inseparability. Of this Treatise, though not 
printed, many gentlemen had copies, which occasioned much 
talke of the Author; and had not his Majestie dissolved the 
11 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Parliament, it had brought him in danger of his life.72 
This quote from Aubrey shows one of the sides of Hobbes's work 
that is most important to this essay, both in terms of exploring the 
positivist tradition and in terms of showing the power of essentialist 
arguments. Hobbes was just too good at playing the definitionalist 
game. By appearing to deduce a set of incredibly powerful political ar-
guments from the "very nature of' law and sovereignty, Hobbes pro-
vides an uncomfortable reminder that the definitional project is (a) 
based on a philosophical fallacy (the fallacy of reification), which (b) 
can have very potent (and somewhat dishonest) political effects. After 
all, it is' well known that Hobbes was hot for centralized state power. 
He was a "political" theorist, implying that he is both non-objective 
and not primarily a jurisprude. If he claims to deduce all of his conclu-
sions from the very definition of law itself, and if there appears to be no 
epistemological difference between his definitional "moves" and those 
of all of the other positivists, then maybe there is something wrong with 
definitionalism! 
In this section, I work through Hobbes's definition of law in Levi-
athan.73 What follows is the greatest tour de force in producing politi-
cal power out of definitions that I have ever come across. If you are 
averse to being manipulated by the massaging of words, then there is 
the same advantage to studying Hobbes on the relationship of language 
and power that there is to learning self-defense from a black-belt in 
karate. But the truly strange thing is that, as I will show in the next 
section, Hobbes does not believe in essences. How can one make a con-
vincing argument about the necessary attributes of law if one does not 
believe in essences? Try to keep this question in mind as you read what 
follows. 
I gave Hobbes's definition of law earlier, but it bears repeating. 
CIVILL LAW, Is to every Subject, those Rules, which the 
Common-wealth hath Commanded him, by Word, Writing, 
or other sufficient Sign of the Will, to make use of, for the 
Distinction of Right, and Wrong; that is to say, of what is 
contrary, and what is not contrary to the Rule. 7. 
Hobbes goes on to use two arguments that I described in an earlier 
paper7G-sovereignty of facts and ordinary language76-to support his 
72 J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 1St. 
78 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 312-35. 
7' !d. at 312. 
76 See Critical Jurisprudence, supra note 5. 
78 These arguments typically appear in the jurisprudential literature because of 
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definition. He claims that his definition contains "nothing that is not at 
first sight evident."'1'1 We might doubt this, but he gives us no time to 
do so. He simply notes that "every man seeth" that laws are only laws 
to those whom they command. Two hundred years later, other theorists 
will turn this claim around, using the sovereignty of facts against him 
and arguing that a law is still a law even if it is not addressed to a 
particular person.'1S Of course, neither of these arguments makes sense 
unless you specify why we should choose to see law in the way the 
theorist suggests. 
Hobbes also throws in a quick piece of apparent equivocation, not-
ing that everyone should see that "[the] Lawes are the Rules of Just, 
and Unjust; nothing being reputed Unjust, that is not contrary to some 
Law."'19 Of course one could pick this apart by a sovereignty of facts 
argument: one simply denies that Hobbes's theory adequately describes 
the world as it is because many unjust things are allowed by the law. 
But Hobbes is not really trying yet. He is saving his response to this 
claim until later. Predictably enough, it will be a sovereignty of theory 
argument; he will claim that natural law and, by implication, right and 
wrong, are defined by the law. One way of reading this is to suppose' 
that he has to keep the two claims apart because otherwise the equivo-
cation would become obvious. Another possible reading, and one that I 
will try to explain more fully later, is that Hobbes is doing something a 
the contradiction involved in carrying out the essentialist project of defining law in an 
era when most theorists do not believe in essences. Sometimes the theorist will argue 
that a particular feature of our ordinary speechways tends to back up her the-
ory-"Most people use the word 'law' to mean the rules presently laid down, not the 
rules as they should be according to some moral blueprint. This fact shows the basic 
truth of positivism and the basic fallacy of natural law." B}lt on other occasions the 
theory will be held up as invalidating or disproving some ordinary us-
age-"International law is not really law because it has no centralized methods of en-
forcement." This is what I mean by equivocation in one's reliance on ordinary 
language. 
I describe one side of the equivocation as a sovereignty of "facts" argument, the 
side in which the theorist uses common assumptions to back up the argument-"It 
would be ridiculous to say that private contracts were rules of law." Conversely, the 
sovereignty of theory argument is the one where the theorist uses the theory to chasten 
the facts-"A law without a penalty is not really a law." 
Typically, theorists oscillate wildly between these arguments without explaining 
why the opposite argument would not be equally valid. As I will argue later, however, 
Hobbes at least offers an explicit transcendental purpose to underpin his argument, and 
a theory of language that demarcates a restricted role for ordinary language usage. See 
also Boyle, supra note 5 (describing similar pattern of repeated contradictions, stem-
ming from unacknowledged fixation on essences, in international law arguments about 
sources, theory, and doctrine). 
77 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 312. 
78 See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 22. 
79 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 312. 
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little more sophisticated. His definition of law is not merely some piece 
of academic essentialism. He believes that his science of politics has 
shown a transcendental purpose behind law, the maintenance of order, 
which gives his definition its genuine metaphysical force. Thus, there 
can be no competing sources of normative authority in the state and, 
under any correct definition of law, right and wrong must be defined 
by the law rather than vice versa. 
Now that the foundation has been laid down, Hobbes makes his 
pitch in earnest for authority. Notice the power of the definitional ar-
gument here. "And therefore, whatsoever can from this definition by 
necessary consequence be deduced, ought to be acknowledged for truth. 
Now I deduce from it this that followeth."80 And deduce he does. He 
deduces that the sovereign is the Legislator. "For the Legislator, is he 
that maketh the Law. And the Common-wealth only, pra:scribes, and 
commandeth the observation of those rules, which we call Law 
.... "81 And because the commonwealth can do nothing except by act-
ing through some legislator, "therefore the Soveraign is the sole Legis-
lator" and is "not Subject to the Civill Lawes."82 The latter point can 
be deduced from the "fact" that it is impossible "for any person to be 
bound to himselfe; because he that can bind, can release; and therefore 
he that is bound to himselfe onely, is not bound."8s 
Again, theorists two centuries later will claim that this is a mis-
take, triumphantly pointing out that members of parliament can be 
bound in their "private capacity" by the rules they make in their "pub-
lic capacity."84 Notice that if Hobbes is seen as defining law in the 
abstract, this "sovereignty of facts" argument shows him up as having 
made the conceptual mistake of ignoring the possibility of role differen-
tiation in his definition. But there is obviously another way of looking 
at what he is doing. 
The standard understanding of Hobbes as a political theorist is 
that he is trying to clarify our comprehension of the conditions under 
which order can be preserved.85 He does this by "resolving" the state 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 313. 
82 Id. 
88 Id. 
IU See H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 42. 
85 See MacPherson, Introduction to LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 9-63 (discus-
sion of the basic issues in Hobbes's thought). The main themes are covered well in 
most of the book-length treatments of Hobbes's ideas. See, e.g., D. GAUTHIER, THE 
LOGIC OF LEVIATHAN (1969) (exploring Hobbes's moral and political philosophy); M. 
GOLDSMITH, HOBBES'S SCIENCE OF POLmcs (1966) (arguing that Hobbes's legal, po-
litical, and religious theories are grounded in his understanding of science); HOBBES 
STUDIES (K. Brown ed. 1965); J. LAIRD, HOBBES (1934) (biography, description of 
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into power-seeking monads and then describing the "composite" that 
would result when they are put back together according to a plan that 
would be rationally acceptable to those same monads.88 If his premises 
were correct, then the role differentiation answer to "who governs the 
governed" would never work. If it does in fact work, Hobbes has been 
shown to have made a far more interesting mistake-the mistake of 
believing that there could never be strong enough negative consequences 
to prevent a governing class from arrogating to itself absolute power, or 
a subordinate class from using the contradiction in the system to de-
stroy it. 
Where did Hobbes go wrong? Did he, as MacPherson suggests,87 
underestimate the power of bourgeois class, as opposed to individual 
interests? Did he underestimate the utopian power of the ideal of the 
rule of law? Did he concentrate so much on the egotistical aspects of 
human personality that he inevitably was going to produce "another 
beautiful theory, mugged by brutal facts?" Did he ignore the fact that 
the legalistic, role-differentiated functions that Sartre describes as one 
source of "bad faith"88 can become part of one's world, in such a way 
intellectual milieu within which Hobbes worked and account of Hobbes's philosophy); 
F. McNEILLY, THE ANATOMY OF LEVIATHAN (1968) (arguing that Leviathan is 
based on a more coherent analysis of human behavior than De Give or The Elements of 
Law); S. MINTZ, THE HUNTING OF LEVIATHAN (1962); R. PETERS, HOBBES (1967) 
(reconstruction of Hobbes's asserted problems and his solutions to them); A. ROGow, 
THOMAS HOBBES: RADICAL IN THE SERVICE OF REAGrION (1986) (biography and 
intellectual history); J. WATKINS, HOBBES'S SYSTEM OF IDEAS (1968) (concluding that 
Hobbes's political theory is implied by his philosophical ideas). 
For a fascinating analysis of Hobbes's metaphysical ideas, which shows the paral-
lels between Hobbes and the Aristotelian philosophy that he criticized, see T. 
SPRAGENS, THE POLITICS OF MOTION (1973). The same connections were subjected to 
a very different analysis by Strauss, see L. STRAUSS, THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF 
HOBBES (1936). I generally disagree with Straussian interpretations of political philos-
ophy, but the book on Hobbes seems to me to be far more impressive than the rest of 
the genre. Spragens' analysis parallels my own at many points and I am considerably 
indebted to his book. My disagreements with his analysis of Hobbes's theory of mean-
ing are explained later. See infra note 138. 
88 See D. GAUTHIER, supra note 85, at 1-5; T. SPRAGENS, supra note 85, at 145-
58; J. WATKINS, supra note 85, at 52-55; MacPherson, supra note 85, at 25-30. 
87 See MacPherson, supra note 85, at 55-56 (Hobbes's theory failed to take into 
account the "force of a cohesive bourgeois class."). 
88 [Almong the thousands of ways which the for-itself has of trying to 
wrench itself away from its original contingency, there is one which 
consists in trying to make itself recognized by the Other as an exis-
tence by right. We insist on our individual rights only within the 
compass of a vast project which would tend to confer existence on us 
in terms of the function which we fulfill. This is the reason why. 
man tries so often to identify himself with his function and seeks to 
see in himself only the 'Presiding Judge of the Court of Appeal,' 
the 'Chief Treasurer and Paymaster' etc. 
J.P. SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 485 (1956). Thus, the "legislator" and the 
1987] THOMAS HOBBES AND POSITIVISM 405 
as to put a veil over the unmediated appetites and aversions of Hob-
bes's hypothetical subjects? One thing is for sure-if one sees his mis-
take as a conceptual one, a failure to realize that legislators could be 
conceived of as both public and private, one will never get to deal with 
any of these questions. If you were to have suggested the role solution 
to Hobbes he probably would have said that human nature and the 
inherent attributes of power made it impossible. He was obviously at 
least partially wrong, but if we see his work as an abstract definition of 
law rather than a normative model of political reality, we will never be 
able to find out why. 
So far Hobbes has struck several fairly powerful blows for the 
sovereign merely by "deducing" the consequences of his definition. He 
has indicated that there can be only one law-making sovereign, who 
must be supreme, who cannot be subject to its own laws, whose "ar-
tificiall reason" guides the laws, and who must be the final arbiter of 
any disputed interpretation. He has also mentioned in passing that 
right and wrong are defined by the laws, rather than vice versa. Next, 
Hobbes goes on to "deduce" that customary laws, or laws that arise 
from long use, really derive their validity from the sovereign's implicit 
agreement. "[I]t is not the Length of Time that maketh the Authority, 
but the Will of the Soveraign signified by his silence .... "89 This 
Will is, of course, revocable at any time because "the Judgment of what 
is reasonable, and of what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that 
maketh the Law, which is the Soveraign Assembly, or Monarch."90 As 
E.P. Thompson's work shows, customary rights were often considered 
one of the most powerful obstacles to centralized power,91 so this is an 
extremely important move. 
The sovereign's authority is asserted over the normative remnants 
of time. Two pages later the same thing happens with space.92 Now we 
come to the third example of this normative colonialism, the argument 
"citizen" may truly see themselves as different people caught in the same body. 
at LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 313. 
to ]d. at 314. 
81 See generally E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
BLACK Acr (1975) (The particular subject of the book is the bitter struggle over hunt-
ing rights between forest farmers and the landed gentry, with the former relying on 
customary entitlements and the latter on more formalized legal rights. A more general 
theme is that social norms can be turned against the ruling class, particularly at a 
moment when a decentralized customary regime is being replaced by a centralized stat-
utory regime. Law appears, not as "the will of the ruling class," but as an arena for 
struggle, and this, of course, is exactly what Hobbes wished to avoid.). 
81 See id. at 315 ("Provinciall Lawes are not made by Custome, but by the Sover-
aign Power.") 
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that carries the sovereign's writ into the transcendental dimension of 
natural law. 
If customary rights, provincial laws, and the power of the judge 
are all subject to the final authority of the sovereign, and if the sover-
eign is not to be bound itself, what other potential sources of normative 
authority remain as challenges to central, secular state power? The 
most obvious answer is natural law. Natural law rhetoric could be used 
to attack and defend particular kings and even to attack and defend the 
institution of the monarchy itself. Hobbes wastes no time in "deducing" 
that "[t]he Law of Nature, and the Civill Law, contain each other, and 
are of equall extent."93 But, lest anyone think that he is putting them 
on a truly equal footing, he quickly explains which is the real container 
and which the thing contained. 
For the Lawes of Nature, which consist in Equity, Justice, 
Gratitude, and other morall Vertues on these depending, in 
the condition of meer Nature ... are not properly Lawes, 
but qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience. 
When a Common-wealth is once settled, then are they actu-
ally Lawes, and not before; as being then the Commands of 
the Common-wealth; and therefore also Civill Lawes: For it 
is the Soveraign Power that obliges men to obey them.94 
Notice that the state has become a necessary condition for the law 
of nature and that the neat definitional twist in the last three phrases 
brings us back to Hobbes's original formulation, with its in-built claim 
tp.at the civil law commands what is right and prohibits what is wrong. 
Absent state power there is no law of nature, merely a set of "qualities 
that dispose men to peace, and to obedience."911 We read this passage as 
cynical moderns. For us, the power of natural law discourse has been 
sapped, in part by the success of the positivist retelling of the tasks of 
jurisprudence. So it may be hard to realize how much of the tradition 
Hobbes was rejecting by defining natural law this way. Not only has 
he defined natural law so that it depends on the existence of the state 
for its normative force, he has also described it as consisting of peaceful, 
obedient qualities that sound more like the Boy Scout's oath, with its 
charmingly general instruction "obey other people," than the activist, 
egalitarian, (and rhyming) natural law put forward by groups like the 
Levellers.96 
93 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 314. 
&4 Id. 
95 [d. 
96 "When Adam delv'd and Eve span, Who then was the gentleman?" Portland 
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Hobbes follows up this tour de force (d'etat) with something that 
sounds suspiciously like a claim that values are subjective and thus, that 
we need an authoritative source of normative judgment, complete with 
attached sanctions.97 
For in the differences of private men, to declare, what is Eq-
uity, what is Justice, and what is morall Vertue, and to 
make them binding, there is need of the Ordinances of 
Soveraign Power, and Punishments to be ordained for such 
as shall break them; which Ordinances are therefore part of 
the Civill Law. The Law of Nature therefore is apart of the 
Civill Law in all Common-wealths of the world. Recipro-
cally also, the Civill Law is a part of the Dictates of 
Nature.98 
So, natural law can hardly present a source of normative challenges to 
the authority of the sovereign; it not only depends on the civil law for 
MSS. (H.M.C.) III, at 86, quoted in C. HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN 
35 (1972). This is surely the shortest argument yet discovered for the artificial quality 
of all social hierarchy. 
91 It is extremely easy to misread Hobbes's use of natural law ideas, particularly 
in this area. I mentioned above Professor Gray's claim that Hobbes makes two errors: 
"the fallacy of excessive realism" and "the compensating fallacy of excessive faith in 
natural law adjudication." See supra text accompanying notes 49-51. I have already 
dealt with the implications of Hobbes's skeptical theory of interpretation. As for his 
"excessive faith in natural law adjudication," Gray has this to say: 
Apart from and because of the de facto relevance of reasonableness alone, 
Hobbes thought that judges ought only to ask what solution would be 
reasonable. They should of course obey the sovereign's orders, reasonable 
or not. But short of the limiting case of an ad hoc command, they should 
consider only the requirements of universal natural law. The ideal society 
would be governed by natural law, subject to the consequences of that 
law's highest imperative, 'seek peace'-subject, that is to say, to the duty 
to obey one sovereign regardless of the justifiability of his commands. 
Judges should act as they would in an ideal society-do justice and eq-
uity-subject to being overruled by the sovereign. They should not excuse 
wrong decisions by pretending to be foreclosed by general instructions, 
which can never unambiguously dictate a concrete act. 
Gray, supra note 45, at xi, xxxiii (interpreting A Dialogue Between a Philosopher & a 
Student of the Common Laws of England, supra note 20, and Hale's Reflections by the 
LTd. Cheife justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe, reprinted in 5 W. 
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW app. 3 (1945». Gray is correct in say-
ing that, when Hobbes argues for natural law adjudication it seems that he would want 
the judge to refrain from hiding behind the words of some general rule. But what 
would be the implication of this "natural law adjudication"? As I have tried to show, 
Hobbes would tell the judge to seek the decision which would be in the sovereign's best 
interest, because the sovereign's best interest is the concrete expressions of justice, eq-
uity, and the imperative "Seek peace." Natural law and "right reason" are reducible to 
raison d'etat. 
88 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 314. 
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its existence and its authority, it even contains a reciprocal obligation to 
obey the civil law. Hobbes tucks in any loose ends by coming back to 
the purpose at the heart of his definition of law, the purpose that he 
felt had been given transcendental authority by his science of politics 
and that thus made his definition more than empty scholastic verbiage. 
Hobbes, in other words, is giving us a definition that does not rely on 
the medieval essences of the «Schoolemen," for whom he felt such 
scorn, but instead, rests on an uncontroversial "purpose," which has 
been verified by a resolutive-compositive science of politics. 
[T]he naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civill Law be 
abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes is 
no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot 
possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world 
for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particu-
lar men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist 
one another, and joyn together against a common Enemy. 99 
Read in this light, Hobbes is more like a twentieth century process 
theorist such as John Hart Ely, who bases his ideas on a claim to have 
identified the uncontentious theory of American government,100 than he 
is like John Austin, (or at least, the received vision of John Austin) 
with his classificatory zeal for the "proper" naming of laws and things 
"improperly so called" laws.101 In fact, of all of the positivist legal phi-
losophers discussed in this essay, Hobbes may be the closest to post-
realist, purposive legal theory. To find out why this is so we must turn 
to his theory of language. Although Hobbes's ideas about language 
have received some attention from political theorists, they have been 
largely ignored by legal theorists-the very people who may have most 
to learn from his discussion of the interrelationship of political power 
and the use of essentialist philosophy. 
v. HOBBES'S THEORY OF LANGUAGE SEEMS TO CHALLENGE 
DEFINITIONAUSM BECAUSE IT Is FOUNDED ON A CRITIQUE OF 
SCHOLASTIC ESSENCES 
At first, Hobbes seems to be an unlikely source for insights about, 
99 [d. at 315 (emphasis added). 
100 See J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87 (1980) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court should adopt a "participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to 
judicial review"). 
101 J. AUSTIN, supra note 9, at 1 ("Laws proper, or properly so called, are com-
mands; laws which are not commands, are laws improper or improperly so called 
laws."). 
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and criticisms of, definitionalism. He says again and again that defini-
tions are fundamental in the search for truth and seems to argue for 
spending more, rather than less time on refining them. But then he 
always adds a caution about the dangers they pose. I love the following 
example because of its charm, but also because it uses the kind of evo-
cative language that we, with the eternal hubris of the present, have 
come to associate with modern, post-Wittgensteinian sermons on the 
limits of knowledge.lo2 
For the errours of Definitions multiply themselves, according 
as the reckoning proceeds; and lead men into absurdities, 
which at last they see, but cannot avoyd . . . and at last 
finding the errour visible, and not mistrusting their first 
grounds, know not which way to cleere themselves; but 
spend time in fluttering over their bookes; as birds that entr-
ing by the chimney, ... flutter at the false light of a glasse 
window, for want of wit to consider which way they came 
in. lOS 
From this passage alone, it might appear that Hobbes is simply 
saying that one should be attentive to one's first premises. So we might 
conclude that jurisprudes should be very careful in formulating their 
definitions of law and that judges and lawyers should be wary in the 
use of syllogismatic reasoning lest they base their reasoning on some 
subtly "incorrect" definition of a legal term and then compound the 
error through a string of cases. That is part of his message, and the 
image of the jurisprudes "fluttering over their books" captures some of 
the compulsive and directionless aspects of positivism. But I think Hob-
bes is also saying something more subtle about the empowering and 
delusive aspects of language itself, something surprisingly similar to the 
critique of reification I introduced earlier. Here is one of his more fa-
mous passages on the subject: 
Nor is it possible without Letters for any man to become 
either excellently wise, or (unless his memory be hurt by dis-
ease, or ill constitution of organs) excellently foolish. For 
words are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: 
but they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the au-
thority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other 
Doctor whatsoever, if but a man."I04 
101 I was disappointed but unsurprised to find that Professor Spragens had al-
ready noted this similarity. See T. SPRAGENS, infra note 85, at 93-94 n.25. 
loa LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 105-06. 
104 [d. at 106. 
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Again, one might almost think that is Wittgenstein talking. Lan-
guage is both a tool and a trap, a potential source of mental cramps as 
well as of excellent wisdom. The philosopher's role is to guard against 
the bewitchment of the intelligence by language. There are more simi-
larities than that. Hobbes's ideas have the same rich, contradictory feel-
ing as those of Wittgenstein. There are the same tensions between 
problem solving and grand speculation, between an intentionalist the-
ory of meaning and ordinary language usage, and there are similar rec-
onciliations-grand speculation redefined as problem solving, intention 
emerging through common usage and sometimes revolting against it. 
Finally, there is the same episodic attention to an issue I plan to discuss 
more fully sometime in the future, the power of language and the lan-
guage of power. But to get to all of this, we have to start at the begin-
ning, which, as I see it, is almost at the end of Leviathan. 
It is, appropriately enough, in the much neglected section on the 
Kingdome of Darknesse, 105 that Hobbes gives one of the clearest expla-
nations of his dissatisfaction with the idea of essences. After a fairly 
complicated discussion of some of the terms of art beloved of scholastic 
philosophy and theology, he offers the following justification of this ap-
parent digression to his perplexed reader: 
But to what purpose (may some man say) is such sub-
tilty in a work of this nature, where I pretend to nothing but 
what is necessary to the doctrine of Government and Obedi-
ence? It is to this purpose, that men may no longer suffer 
themselves to be abused, by them, that by this doctrine of 
Separated Essences, built on the Vain Philosophy of Aris-
totle, would fright them from Obeying the Laws of their 
Countrey, with empty names; as men fright Birds from the 
Corn with an empty doublet, a hat, and a crooked stick.l08 
Hobbes is certainly not restricting himself to linguistic essences 
here. The discussion focuses on the link between Catholicism and Aris-
totelian thought, with excursions into the taste of bread, the location of 
the soul, and the source of virtue. But I think that the quote illuminates 
two important points in our analysis of the power of linguistic reifica-
tion, points that I will try to substantiate in what follows. First, as I 
hope subsequent quotations will show, Hobbes realizes that the idea of 
essences involves the same epistemological error whether the essences 
are supposed to be of words, objects, or souls. Second, Hobbes was not 
105 Id. at 627.715. 
10\1 I d. at 691. 
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only critical of scholastic method because he thought its reliance on es-
sence was "a mistake," he thought the scholastic essences doctrine could 
have a powerful and malevolent political effect. His criticism of es-
sences was designed specifically to counter this effect-to stop this 
"Vain Philosophy" of "Separated Essences" from frightening citizens 
out of their obedience to the "Laws of their Countrey, with empty 
names."107 Positivists, who have erected their discipline on something 
suspiciously similar to this "Vain Philosophy" of "Separated Essences" 
might do well to consider his criticisms. And, because every legal argu-
ment is, in a sense, the wringing of political power out of the meanings 
of words, we cannot consign his message to the softly irrelevant fringe 
of academic jurisprudence. 
If all of this is true, and Hobbes is criticizing the idea of essences 
because of its philosophical errors and its political consequences, we are 
faced with three fairly perplexing questions. First, what theory of lan-
guage is he going to put in the place of the idea that words express the 
essences of objects? Second, what is he, himself, doing when he defines 
"not ... what is Law here, and there; but what is Law."108 Which 
leads us to the third question: How does his theory of language fit his 
legal theory? Specifically, how can it fit in with both the attempt to 
define the meaning of law and then deduce from it "what follows as a 
matter of necessary consequence," and with the claim that all laws have 
need of interpretation because of the "divers meanings of words." If all 
words have "divers meanings," then his definition of law is one among 
many "correct" definitions. And if that is true, then how can Hobbes 
get away with the project we looked at earlier: the attempt to "deduce" 
from the definition, as a matter of "necessary consequence," that all 
normative systems have their basis in the sovereign? 
The first two questions may be the hardest ones. Hobbes has gen-
erally been seen as a radical nominalist,109 that is, someone who be-
lieves that the only thing shared by a general class of phenomena de-
noted by a single name (i.e., games, chairs) is the name itself. 
[Slome [names] are Common to many things; as Man, Horse, 
Tree; every of which though but one Name, is nevertheless 
107 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 691. 
108 !d. at 311-12. 
108 See T. SPRAGENS, supra note 85, at 87 ("The relationship of the name to the 
object is, in fact, dissolved by Hobbes, who considers names to be 'signs of our concep-
tions' and manifestly 'not signs of the things themselves.''') (quoting W. MOLES-
WORTH, 1 THE ENGLISH WORKS OF THOMAS HOBBES 17 (1966) [hereinafter ENG-
LISH WORKS]); Krook, Thomas Hobbes's Doctrine of Meaning and Truth, 31 
PHILOSOPHY 3-22 (1956); Oakeshott, Editor's Introduction to T. HOBBES, LEVIA-
THAN at xxiv (M. Oakeshott ed. 1946). 
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the name of divers particular things; in respect of all which 
together, it is called an Universall; there being nothing in 
the world Universall but Names; for the things named, are 
every one of them Individual and Singular.110 
And because words are the only Universals it is obvious that 
to put genus and species for things, and definition for the 
nature of any thing, as the writers of methaphysics have 
done, is not right, seeing they be only significations of what 
we think of the nature of things . . . . 
. . . For definition is not the essence of any thing, but a 
speech signifying what we conceive of the essence thereof 
111 
We do not attach the name to the class of phenomena by looking for an 
essence of gameness or chairness in each game or chair.u2 To be sure, 
all games do have one common property: they are all called "games." 
This is a tidy and attractive answer, although, if you have not encoun-
tered it before, you may have to think about it for a while to see the 
problems that it raises. If we say the same thing about "law," then 
Hobbes's claim that all laws must have the sovereign-centered qualities 
described in his definition seems ridiculous. If names are the only 
universals, the only thing that all laws share is the name "law"? After 
Hobbes renounces the idea of essences, it is hard enough to see how he 
can maintain the definitional-deductive side of his jurisprudence, but 
when he replaces it by an extreme version of nominalism the task seems 
impossible. Anyway, where do these "names" come from? Is it totally 
arbitrary that this set of phenomena, rather than some other set, ends 
up being called "games"? And what if we are in doubt as to whether 
something really is a "game," really is a "law"? We cannot give a 
nominalist answer to the question "What is it?" because we do not 
know what it is called. 
I think the answer to all of these questions lies in Hobbes's theory 
of meaning, a theory which can be seen quite clearly in the following 
110 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 102. 
m 1 ENGLISH WORKS, supra note 109, at 21, 60. 
112 See L. WrrrGENSTElN, supra note 7, at 31. 
Consider . . . the proceedings that we call "games." I mean board-
games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is com-
mon to them all?-Don't say: "There must be something common, or they 
would not be called 'games' . . . . For if you look at them you will not see 
something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a 
whole series of them at that. 
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throwaway remark, made as a preface to one of his chapters on biblical 
interpretation. What is more, it is an answer that may actually allow 
him to reconcile his nominalism with his definition of law. "Seeing the 
foundation of all true Ratiocination, is the constant Signification of 
words; which in the Doctrine following, dependeth not (as in naturall 
science) on the Will of the Writer, nor (as in common conversation) on 
vulgar use, but on the sense they carry in the Scripture .... "113 
There are no essences, and the only thing shared by a general class 
of phenomena that is denoted by a general name is the name itself. But 
names can come from different sources and, although the cardinal rule 
in "all true ratiocination" is to keep the meanings of words constant, 
one must first know the correct source. In an earlier essay I pointed out 
the difficulty of reconciling two different sides of language use.114 Does 
meaning come from the intention of the user-"Words mean what I 
want them to mean" -or does it depend on the linguistic practices of 
the society? If the former is the case, what are the limits of this purpo-
sive idea of language? How far can we go? If the latter, is it ever 
proper to change the meaning of a word or does normal usage imply 
normative correctness?l1l5 
Hobbes is putting forth a sophisticated theory of meaning that al-
lows for different practices of signification depending on the kind of 
activity in which the speaker or writer is engaged. In common conver-
sation, it would be unwise to depart radically from the ordinary lan-
guage meaning (the vulgar use) of a word. But in "naturall science," 
when philosophers are constructing theories about the world, they can-
not be tied to vulgar usage. The meaning of a word must come from 
the "will of the writer," so that the philosopher can fashion words into 
tools capable of resolving a particular problem. Remember that "words 
are wise mens counters, they do but reckon by them: but they are the 
mony of fooles."1l6 What is the difference between counters and 
money? Money is (thought to be) intrinsically valuable; we might think 
that it has its own meaning. Counters, on the other hand, are only 
valuable insofar as they allow you to perform some task. They have 
whatever meaning we choose to give them (think of assigning value to 
different colored poker chips).u'1 I.think that Hobbes is saying that, 
113 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 428 (emphasis added). 
114 See Boyle, supra note 3. 
11& See id. at 708-15, particularly n.79 (Common usage theorists "frequently move 
from claims about 'normal' usage to claims about normatively correct usage without 
realizing the extent to which this involves them in the naturalistic fallacy."). 
11S LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 106. 
11"1 This thought can be pushed even further. Actually both money and counters 
require us to invest them with meaning and value, something which is much harder to 
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when we are engaged in "naturall science," we should have the same 
freedom to assign meaning-to shape the meanings of words according 
to the tasks in which we are engaged. 
So the answers to the first two questions I posed-what theory of 
language Hobbes puts in place of essentialism and what exactly Hob-
bes is doing, when he himself defines law-are rather complicated. 
Hobbes rejects the scholastic idea that a general term (such as "law") 
signifies a common property, or essence, in each of the phenomena it 
describes. I asked what theory of language he offered instead of the 
scholastic one. The answer seems to be that he is a nominalist; but if 
that were true, one would expect his jurisprudence to rest on the idea 
that the only "property" that all "laws" share is that they are all called 
"laws." Needless to say, this would not fit very well with the project of 
deducing, from the unchanging definition of law, the normative pri-
macy of the sovereign. But Hobbes is more subtle than this. 
How do names get attached to phenomena, if not by tracing the 
outlines of some essential feature? Hobbes gives us two answers. In 
everyday speech, they get attached by common ("vulgar") usage, says 
Hobbes, apparently reserving ordinary language philosophy for ordi-
nary conversations. When theorizing, they are attached according to the 
will of the writer. In either case, we should keep the meaning of our 
terms constant. The person who does not do so will end up "entangled 
in words, as a bird in lime-twigges; the more he struggles, the more 
belimed."1l8 Which is all very well, but how is the theorist to know the 
"correct" meaning, the meaning that is to be kept constant if the "rati-
ocination" is to proceed correctly? It is not much help to say that the 
meaning comes from the philosopher's will; how is a poor philosopher 
to know what to will? 
We can rule out some answers. The philosopher cannot claim that 
do to grubby pieces of green paper than to cowrie shells. But, the "meaning" of money 
involves a general, societal, and authoritative infusion of meaning-a collective idolatry 
that is hidden from everyday reflection. (Compare the "meaning" of a banknote in 
Weimar Germany with the "meaning" you discern when you look in your wallet to see 
if you have enough for lunch.) The meaning of counters, on the other hand, is infused 
according to private, personal, and idiosyncratic decisions. So the distinction is not "in-
herent meaning" versus "purposive meaning," but public, collective and generally un-
conscious, versus private, individual and generally conscious. This reading would make 
Hobbes's analogy even more complicated, because it would indicate that he is defending 
a pragmatist, purposive theory of language against a theory that locates the meaning of 
words in the external approval of some "authority," be it societal (as in our common 
speechways) or, as Hobbes specifically says, the authority, accorded to past thinkers. 
"[B]ut they are the mony of fooles, that value them by the authority of an Aristotle, a 
Cicero, or a Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man." LEVIATHAN, 
supra note 17, at 106. 
U8 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 105. 
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there is some essence to which her usage of terms must be faithful. 
That would just lead us back into Hobbes's nominalist attack on scho-
lastic philosophy. She cannot rely on the authority of past definitions, 
even those backed up "by the authority of an Aristotle, a Cicero, or a 
Thomas, or any other Doctor whatsoever, if but a man."119 In fact, she 
must be ready "to examine the Definitions of former Authors; and ei-
ther to correct them, where they are negligently set down; or to make 
them" herself.120 And as was pointed out earlier, she need not rely on 
"vulgar use" if she is engaged in "naturall science." This, in turn, 
seems to indicate that when Hobbes is prescribing for theorists, as op-
posed to conversationalists, he deserts (or expands on) the pure nomi-
nalist idea that definitions are explorations of "truths constituted arbi-
trarily by the inventors of speech.m21 
Thus, received wisdom, ordinary language use, and transcendental 
essences are all unavailable as sources of true meaning. Which leaves 
us with ... ? It leaves us with science. Or, to be more accurate, there 
are good reasons to see Hobbes as one who was relying on the scientific 
method (as he understood it) for his ultimate epistemological backstop. 
Aubrey gives us the most notable comment on Hobbes's attraction to 
one component of his "scientific method," geometry. 
He was 40 yeares old before he looked on Geometry; which 
happened accidentally. Being in a Gentleman's Library, Eu-
clid's Elements lay open, and 'twas the 47 El. libn 1. He 
read the Proposition. By G--1 sayd he, (he would now and 
then sweare an emphaticall Oath by way of emphasis) this is 
impossible! So he reads the Demonstration of it, which re-
ferred him back to such a Proposition; which Proposition he 
read. That referred him back to another, which he also read. 
Et sic deinceps [and so on] that at last he was demonstra-
tively convinced of that trueth. This made him in love with 
Geometry .122 
It did, indeed. In fact, it seems to be one of the factors that led him to 
have such a high regard for clarity in definition, a regard he did not 
think was shared by others. 
[T]here can be nothing so absurd, but may be found in the 
books of Philosophers. And the reason is manifest. For there 
is not one of them that begins his ratiocination from the Def-
118 [d. at 106. 
120 [d. at 105. 
121 1 ENGUSH WORKS, supra note 109, at 37. 
122 J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 160. 
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initions, or Explications of the names they are to use; which 
is a method that hath been used onely in Geometry; whose 
Conclusions have thereby been made indisputable.123 
Although this demonstrates the influence of mathematical thought 
on Hobbes's work, it seems only to tell us that our definitions should be 
clear, without telling us what those definitions should be. Or does it? 
C.B. MacPherson puts it nicely: "But something more than his discov-
ery of Euclid was needed before he could apply anything like a geomet-
rical deductive method to politics. What was needed was a basic hy-
pothesis about the nature of things, which could embrace the actions of 
men in society and their relations with each other .... "124 The miss-
ing element came from the work of Galileo. 
When he was at Florence, he contracted a friendship with 
the famous Galileo, whom he extremely venerated and mag-
nified . . . . They pretty well resembled one another as to 
their countenances .... [A]nd had both a consimilitie of 
Fate, to be hated and persecuted by the Ecclesistiaques."l21i 
And Hobbes confirms the importance of Galileo's method on his 
own science of politics. 
Galileus in our time was the first that opened to us the gate 
of natural philosophy universal, which is knowledge of the 
nature of motion. Lastly, the science of man's body, the most 
profitable part of natural science, was first discovered with 
admirable sagacity by our countryman Doctor Harvey. Nat-
ural philosophy is therefore but young; but civil philosophy 
is yet much younger, as being no older (I say it provoked, 
and that my detractors may know how little they have 
wrought on me) than my own book De cive. 128 
Hobbes seems to have been fascinated by two components of Galileo's 
method. The first is the idea of motion, which becomes Hobbes's 
master metaphor for cause, be it physical, societal, or mental.127 There 
128 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 113-14. 
124 MacPherson, Introduction, supra note 85, at 18. 
125 J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 157. 
128 2 ENGLISH WORKS, supra note 109, at 8. 
127 Notice that the other person mentioned is Doctor Harvey, another pioneer of 
the explanation of motion. He, as Aubrey so calmly puts it, was the "Inventor of the 
Circulation of the Bloud." J. AUBREY, suprG; note 18, at 127. Harvey was less critical 
of Aristotelian philosophy, however, than Hobbes. He told Aubrey, for example, to 
"goe to the Fountain head, and read Aristotle, Cicero, Avicenna, and did call the Ne-
oteriques shitt-breeches." Id. at 128-29. 
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is a second component to Hobbes's indebtedness to Galileo. How does 
one understand motion? Let Hobbes explain: 
[E]verything is best understood by its constructive causes. 
For as in a watch, or some small engine, the matter, figure, 
and motion of the wheels cannot be well known, except it be 
taken insunder and viewed in parts; so to make a more curi-
ous search into the rights of states and the duties of subjects, 
it is necessary, 1. say, not to take them insunder, but yet that 
they be so considered as if they were dissolved.128 
And in this manner, by resolving continually, we may 
come to know what those things are, whose causes being first 
known severally, and afterwards compounded, bring us to 
the knowledge of singular things. I conclude, therefore, that 
the method of attaining to the universal knowledge of things, 
is purely analytical.129 
So science rests on the idea of taking things apart, or "resolving" 
them and then, as Galileo had done, putting those parts together so as 
to describe the motion of the whole. Once we have taken the Gallilean 
step of imagining the smallest forces that explain the phenomenon, we 
can turn to our Euclidean mode of "ratiocination from definitions." I 
think that this vision of science explains the connection that Hobbes 
saw between science and the making of definitions. 
For REASON, in this sense, is nothing but Reckoning (that 
is, Adding and Subtracting) of the Consequences of general 
names agreed upon, for the marking and signifying of our 
thoughts . . . . ISO 
The Light of humane minds is Perspicuous Words, but by 
exact definitions first snuffed, and purged from ambiguity; 
Reason is the pace; Encrease of Science, the way; and the 
Benefit of man-kind, the end. lSI 
If all of this is right, it would explain how a "radical nominalist" 
can make an apparently definitionalist argument about the necessary 
qualities of law. The argument would go something like this. Follow-
ing our Gallilean-Euclidean method, we resolve the state into its small-
est comprehensible element-the citizen. Then we resolve the citizens' 
motivations into their smallest comprehensible units-appetites and 
118 2 ENGUSH WORKS, supra note 109, at xiv. 
128 1 ENGUSH WORKS, supra note 109, at 69. 
lao LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 111. 
131 ld. at 116. 
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aversions. This part of the story is familiar. Analysis of these appetites 
and aversions leads to the conclusion that human desires are basically 
opposed because the measurement of my effective power (the ability to 
satisfy my appetites for "some future apparent good"132) is the extent 
to which my power exceeds that of others. No agreement among citi-
zens can palliate the negative consequences of this existence, because as 
soon as it was in my best interests, I would break the agreement. "Cov-
enants, without the Sword, are but Words. "133 Perceiving all of this, 
however, as a rational actor I would be willing to give up this state of 
affairs if I could be assured of peace, that is, if I could be assured that 
everyone else will be as constrained as I am. And, of course, only the 
Leviathan, the strong state, can guarantee me all of this. So we have 
"composed" our resolved elements back into a vision of what a properly 
functioning state would look like. Now, and only now, does it make 
sense to define law. And how do we do this? Not by grasping some 
preexisting essential conceptual component of legality. Not by wander-
ing our everyday speechways playing fast and loose with the difference 
between normal usage and normatively correct usage. Not even by rely-
ing on the arbitrary names bestowed by time and authority. A resolu-
tive-compositive science of politics gives us the true purpose of law, and 
thus the true definition of law.1u 
[T]he naturall Liberty of man, may by the Civil Law be 
abridged, and restrained: nay, the end of making Lawes, is 
no other, but such Restraint; without the which there cannot 
possibly be any Peace. And Law was brought into the world 
for nothing else, but to limit the naturall liberty of particular 
182 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 150. 
188 !d. at 223. 
184 This points out the difference between my account and that of Professor 
Spragens. How can Hobbes carry on his definitional project given his critique of es-
sences? Professor Spragens feels that the whole weight of the theoretical edifice is 
thrown onto Hobbes's nominalist theory of meaning-which clearly is unable to bear 
the burden. I have argued that this is not entirely the case because Hobbes's situational 
theory of meaning allows him to grant the theorist freedom from the prison-house of a 
language in which names are attached arbitrarily. Thus the theory of meaning can be 
plugged back into the scientific/compositive-resolutive method, the same method which 
gives us the fundamental purpose, or epistemological standpoint, for Hobbes's defini-
tions. For other interpretations of Hobbes's theory of meaning, see M. GOLDSMITH, 
supra note 85, at 8-13; J. WATKINS, supra note 85, at 138-62; Krook, supra note 109, 
at 3-22; Oakeshott, supra note 109, at xxiv. To me it seems that all of these accounts 
also underestimate the contextual quality of Hobbes's theory of "true ratiocination" 
and "constant signification." In other word~, they fail to recognize that in "natural 
science" signification depends on "the will of the writer," in common conversation on 
"vulgar use," and in theology on "the sense that [words] carry in the Scripture." LEVI-
ATHAN, supra note 17, at 427. 
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men, in such manner, as they might not hurt, but assist one 
another, and joyn together against a common Enemy.1315 
419 
So, when contemporary theorists see Hobbes's theory as containing 
unwanted, "nonlegal" elements, they fail to realize that he was operat-
ing with a much more sophisticated epistemology behind his definition 
than they have behind theirs. The definition of law had to be tied to the 
theory of the state; to the question of the political justification of the 
state or of "sovereign power"; and thus to the "scientific" theory of 
appetites and aversions and to the fundamental purpose that that the-
ory revealed. Otherwise it would not be a definition, but a "Vain Phi-
losophy" of "Separated Essences." In order to define law without such 
a purpose, we would have to make an error that Hobbes knew very 
well. "The fifth [cause of absurd assertions is] the giving of the names 
of accidents [phenomenological qualities], to names and speeches; as 
they do that say, the nature of a thing is its definition; a man's com-
mand is his will; and the like. "186 
If we translated Hobbes's fifth cause of absurd assertions into 
modern philosophical language, we might say that it was (at least par-
tially) a critique of reification. We have fancy terms for the errors that 
Hobbes described. We have learned a lot. But jurisprudence is still con-
ceived as being the search for the nature or definition of law. H.L.A. 
Hart's theory of interpretation is concerned with the core meanings of 
words,187 and positivists can still argue that "lawyers engaged in their 
·professional work . . . take the government of their state as something 
given."138 All of this tends to maintain the idea of a purified legal sci-
ence that can separate the fields of political and legal theory by separat-
ing the definition of law from the purpose that it serves. So perhaps we 
have not learned very much after all. 
VI. THERE Is A REVEALING CONNECTION BETWEEN HOBBES'S 
THEORY AND CURRENT DEBATES ABOUT LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
So far, I have been arguing that Hobbes is much more than a legal 
theorist, and that his theory challenges positivist jurisprudence in all 
the ways described in my verbose section headings. Now I want to re-
verse myself; to consider Hobbes as "merely" a jurisprude. For me, one 
of the most interesting things about rereading Hobbes's work as a legal 
theorist is the precise connection between his theory of interpretation 
185 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 315. 
18S [d. at 114. 
187 H.L.A. HART, supra note 9, at 121-32. 
188 E. PATTERSON, supra note 51, at 92. 
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and our current debates about the same subject. All laws need interpre-
tation because of the "diverse meanings of words," and this interpreta-
tion must be guided by some higher principle. So says Hobbes, and a 
long line of contemporary Anglo-American legal theorists would agree. 
They would differ, as I pointed out earlier, about what that higher 
guide to interpretation should be. It has taken a long time, but it seems 
that even orthodox legal theorists are coming to agree with Hobbes that 
"reason" alone cannot do the trick.139 Not that Hobbes is against rea-
son. He just wants to know, "Whose reason?" The contemporary an-
swer seems to be that we should rely on the collective wisdom of the 
legal profession and of legal institutions, imbued as they are with all 
kinds of painfully gleaned experience, and hedged around with all 
kinds of real, if unspecifiable, professional, communal, and aesthetic 
constraints. 140 
This is not an unfamiliar theory. Throughout the twentieth cen-
tury, belief in the essential forms of law, science, art, and language has 
been fading. In its place there has been an increasing reliance on the 
views of the "relevant community of experts." The criterion of truth 
and interpretation passes from The Scientific Method to micro-commu-
nities of scientists, from the Essential Meaning of Words to ordinary 
language usage, from the Forms of Art to the artistic community, from 
The Novel, to the author, to the readers, and then, alas, to the literary 
critics.l4l Stanley Fish's interpretive community of professionals142 and 
Ronald Dworkin's comparison of law to a (soft-porn) chain noveP43 do 
much the same thing, albeit a little belatedly and with emphases that 
seem (to Dworkin and Fish) to be very different. 
In looking at the process by which strong essentialist claims are 
renounced in favor of a reliance on the opinion of a professional com-
munity, we should remember that it is not a phenomenon unique to the 
twentieth century. Hobbes was faced with the idea that we should defer 
to the interpretation of the professional community of lawyers and he 
did not like it. In large part, his concern was that lawyers might set 
themselves up as possible challengers to the sovereign, something that 
we may be a little less worried about, "hyperlexis" notwithstanding. 
But he also had strong theoretical objections on other grounds. In fact 
188 See LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 14. 
140 See supra note 3. 
141 See authorities cited supra note 3. 
14a S. FISH, supra note 38, at 322-37. 
143 LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 14, at 728-39. In the most recent version of the 
chain-novel analogy, Naked Came the Stranger has been replaced by the Bible, soap 
operas, and the Odyssey. The first and third seem like shaky analogies and the second 
does not do much for the dignity of law's empire. 
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he spends a large part of the Dialogue Between a Philosopher and a 
Student of the Common Laws of Englandl44 elaborating on his belief 
that neither the professional community of lawyers nor their "product," 
the artificial reason of the common law, is capable of resolving 
problems of interpretation. 
His arguments are the same ones that I mentioned earlier. Re-
course to "private reason" would lead to contradiction in the laws. 
"Long study may ... confirm erroneous Sentences." We need a source 
of decision that stands above the "disputes of private men.»141i Much of 
the recent scholarship has consisted in restating these arguments. But 
there is a more important theme that emerges from Hobbes's writing, a 
theme that should speak to us, appeal to us, even if we do not feel 
anarchy to be either as close or as dangerous as he did. Hobbes fears 
that social decisionmaking will be carved up into a multitude of private 
satrapies, and that is a fear which we can, and should, share. 
What if we do throwaway all pretensions to the upper case ver-
sions of our disciplines? What if we say that law is what the legal 
community says it is, that science is what scientists are willing to ac-
cept, that art is what you can get away with in front of your artistic 
peers? Personally I think these arguments have just the same problems 
as the ones they replace. The questions "what is art, law, science?" are 
simply converted to the question of who is in the relevant community, 
with all the same problems of indeterminacy, political tilt, and infinite 
regress. But even if this were not true, the current vogue for replacing 
essentialism with expert opinion raises the specter of donating public 
decisionmaking to private groups. 
If we adopt the professional community theory of "What is law," 
is it too cynical to expect that the legal profession will go on claiming to 
the outside world that lawyers are neutral technicians merely working 
with the brute objectivity of the law? And if the story for external, 
public relations, distribution continues to rely on a sort of crude formal-
ism, will the sophisticated defenders of the profession still try to silence 
their internal critics by claiming to be a trustworthy community of 
truth-seekers who actually create the reality which they claimed, a mo-
ment ago, to be describing? A world in which political questions be-
come technical questions, and in which the legal profession "has it both 
ways" -Langdell to the outside world and Kuhn to the inside-is not a 
world that appeals to me. And if it seems strange that Hobbes, guard-
ian of order that he was, prompts such thoughts, remember that, at 
144 T. HOBBES, supra note 20. 
14& See LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 316-17. 
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least where philosophers and lawyers were concerned, he was also a 
virulent anti-professional. 
CONCLUSION 
I hope that this essay gives some sense of the hundreds of discrete 
insights into law, language, and definition that we tend to neglect when 
we think of Hobbes only as the apologist for strong central government 
(which he certainly was). In the conclusion I want to concentrate on 
only one of the themes of the essay: the light that Hobbes throws on the 
line between legal and political theory. 
Hobbes shows us a lot about the process of policing the boundary 
between legal and social theory. He helped me, at least, to understand 
the eagerness with which positivists have attempted to separate them-
selves from predictive, historical, or argumentative maps of law, on the 
one hand, and political theories of obligation and justification on the 
other. The first way that Hobbes helps us understand the positivist 
enterprise of defining law is by exploring the linguistic error on which 
much of it is based. "A great muddle . . . resulted because people 
thought there was something in common between all the things called 
'good' ."146 That is Wittgenstein talking, but it could just as well be 
Hobbes, telling us that the only thing shared by all the phenomena 
grouped under a single name is the name itself. 
The second way in which Hobbes helps us (and helps us in a way 
that Wittgenstein, for example, does not) is by showing that the use or 
definition of essences in an argument is not just a philosophical "mis-
take." Hobbes has a very concrete reason for engaging in such philo-
sophical "subtilty" as a critique of linguistic, metaphysical, and theo-
logical essentialism in a work where he . 
pretend[s] ... nothing but what is necessary to the doctrine 
of Government and Obedience[.] It is to this purpose, that 
men may no longer suffer themselves to be abused, by them, 
that by this doctrine of Separated Essences built on the Vain 
Philosophy of Aristotle . . . would fright them from Obey-
ing the Laws of their country with empty names . . . ."147 
And, of course, that is not the only use to which one can put an argu-
ment from essences; arguments that justify the oppression of one group 
by another frequently depend on claims about the essential qualities of 
146 WIITGENSTEIN'S LECTURES, CAMBRIDGE 1932-1935, at 45-46 (A. Ambrose 
ed. 1979). 
147 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 691. 
1987) THOMAS HOBBES AND POSITIVISM 423 
both dominator and dominated. This is a fact that women, Jews, 
Blacks, and members of the working class have all learned to their 
detriment. 
The point that I am trying to make is that claims about essences 
manage to make a value judgement without seeming to do so. They are 
more than just "mistakes" because they are not located in a heaven of 
legal concepts. They are part of a world in which people say, "X group 
lacks the essential qualities of human beings and, therefore, the rules of 
conduct toward humans do not apply," as well as saying "Y lacks the 
essential qualities of a law and, therefore, you need not obey it." These 
line-drawing definitionalist arguments may produce results we like or 
hate. They may be used consciously to some deep end, or the arguments 
may take over their practitioners, as I believe is the case with positivist 
jurisprudence. In either case, they are dangerous. If we need Wittgen-
stein to warn us against mental cramps and the bewitchment of the 
intelligence by language, we need Hobbes to remind us what you can 
do with the bewitchment of language. 
The third way in which Hobbes helps us is perhaps the simplest, 
perhaps the most complicated, way of all. He tells us to avoid the pre-
dicament of the definitionalists, "fluttering over their bookes; as birds 
that entring by the chimney, and finding themselves inclosed in a cham-
ber, flutter at the false light of a glasse window, for want of wit to 
consider which way they came in."l48 And he does so by example, in a 
theory that tries to escape the trap by tying his definition of law to the 
uncontroversial purposes that are revealed by a science of politics. Per-
haps the single most important thing that we have to learn from Hob-
bes is the idea that his definition serves a purpose and that, unless we 
can get around the critique of essences, our definitions also have to be 
guided by a purpose. 
This seems to collapse the line between legal and political theory 
because, if you cannot define "what law really is," but instead must 
choose your vision of reality, all definitions become subject to the test of 
morality. It may be the morality of giving an instrumental-predictive 
definition of the law to your client or the morality of a definition that 
deduces the existence or nonexistence of legal obligation from concep-
tual components, but it is a "morality" nonetheless and not a world of 
pure concepts confronted by a disinterested observer. 
Before we ask whether Hobbes, himself, "succeeded" and inquire 
into the morality of his definition, we should ask, "Should our jurispru-
dence follow the model of his?" Is the only correct definition of law one 
148 Id. at 105-06. 
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that explains the justification for state power and the obligation to obey 
the laws? It certainly looks both more interesting and more method-
ologically sound than the attempt to produce a reductionist, conceptual 
exegesis for no particular purpose at all. And, for those reasons among 
others, trenchant critics such as Philip Soper have argued that we 
should desert positivism for a legal theory that focuses on moral and 
political obligation, in his case a theory that claims: that "Legal systems 
are essentially characterized by the belief in value, the claim in good 
faith by those who rule that they do so in the interests of all."149 
This theory at least tries to fulfill some real purpose. It tries to 
answer the question, "If I wanted to know when I should obey a rule 
of law, what kind of definition of law would you give me?" And it may 
be worthwhile in a way that Kelsen's concept splitting is not, although 
personally, I am skeptical that any formulation of the obligation to 
obey could be arrived at that was neither tautological nor "void for 
vagueness." But that still leaves open the question of whether the real 
essence of law can only be described in terms of the obligation to obey. 
I think not, for the obvious reason that this is just moving the error 
back one stage. We realize that there is no essence to law, but instead a 
multitude of realities, each evoked by a particular context and purpose. 
So what do we do? The wrong answer, I believe, is to claim that there 
is one essential purpose, that rules supreme, from which we can con-
template the true reality of law. This is the "mistake" that Hobbes 
makes in his fixation on order. 
In the end, Hobbes's theories suffer from many of the same 
problems as those of the legal process theories of the twentieth century. 
Both are founded on the rejection of essences, the process theorists be-
cause they had absorbed the critiques that the legal realists had made of 
formalism, and Hobbes because he had a strong aversion to the "Vain 
Philosophy" of "Separated Essences" that was peddled by "deceived, or 
deceiving Schoolemen."ll5o Lacking an essentialist philosophy, both 
Hobbes and the legal proces~ theorists turned to the idea of unconten-
tious purposes. If they could find the purpose behind a rule or a state 
or an institutional structure, they could continue to theorize, in almost 
the same way as the group against whom they had reacted, but by 
whom they had been so influenced. But the "purpose" never could be 
quite broad enough; it always seemed as though there were other pur-
poses that were equally valid. Then there was the problem of where 
you got your purposes from. Hobbes claimed that his were immanent 
He P. SOPER, A THEORY OF LAW 55 (1984) (arguing that current positivist theo-
ries of law are misdirected in that they divorce legal theory from moral theory). 
1110 LEVIATHAN, supra note 17, at 99. 
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in a proper understanding of the appetites and aversions of human be-
ings. The process theorists claimed that theirs were immanent in the 
institutional structure and the constitutional documents. But if that is 
the case, both projects must surely be limited to pure description; they 
have no power to say that any existing practice is wrong, because the 
theory is supposed to come from an analysis of existing practice. 
The next move is to identify some practices as aberrant: mistakes, 
perversions, and deviations from the true path. But that supposes a 
meta-principle that identifies the real path and where does the meta-
principle come from? Yo ho and we're off into the familiar infinite 
regress. The purposive project fails, as did the essentialist project that 
went before it. It may seem as though I am saying that the mistakes are 
really the same-transcendental essences, transcendental purposes, 9l 
ne faire rien-it is a difference that is no difference. But I must admit 
that it seems like an advance to me, a sentiment that, at first, caused me 
all kinds of historicist shame. 
There are a number of explanations for thinking that Hobbes's 
ideas (and to a lesser extent, those of the process theorists) are doing 
something more worthwhile than those of the essentialists against 
whom they reacted. It might be simply that the brilliance of Hobbes's 
thought becomes more important than its soundness. Aubrey thought 
that was the case: "But one may say of him, as one sayes of Jos. 
Scaliger, that where he erres, he erres so ingeniosely, that one had 
rather erre with him then hitt the marke with Clavius."l,lil But I think 
there is a better reason. 
Hobbes opens up the connection between the language of power 
and the power of language. He, more than any of his contemporaries, 
seems to have been aware of the power that one could exercise if one 
could grasp and define an existing source of legitimacy, or even create a 
new source. Whether it was natural law, provincial law, time-honored 
custom, or the interpretive abilities of the subordinate judge, Hobbes 
was determined to show that it must all be linked back to the sovereign. 
And in the course of doing this, he followed the path wherever it led. 
To understand society, you had to understand motion, and relation-
ships, and universals, and essences, and sentiments, and optics, and 
who knows what else. So Hobbes wrote about them. He realized that 
most of the questions with which he was dealing resolved themselves 
into questions about epistemology-what is it to Know, to be Right? So 
he wrote about epistemology, and politics, and legal theory, and biblical 
interpretation. If we are only now beginning to see the connections be-
1&1 J. AUBREY, supra note 19, at 151. 
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tween a theory of knowledge, a theory of interpretation, a theory of 
judicial review, and the legitimacy of the state, we cannot blame Hob-
bes. He had always said these things were connected, and he offered us 
a picture of how they might be connected, which, even though we may 
think it is wrong, has never been surpassed in its coherence, its power, 
and its depth. 
Hobbes is like the magician who tells you where the trick is and 
still dares you to spot it. He shows the emptiness of all theories that 
relied on the defining of essences and still rests his legal theory on a 
definition of the necessary attributes of law. It is only when one traces 
that theory from its nominalist beginnings, through its science of mo-
tion, its analysis of human motivations, and its recomposed state that 
one realizes how much more it is than a positivist definition of law. It 
is a tool kit of political arguments, it is an anti-professional attack on 
philosophers and lawyers, it is a pragmatist theory of meaning, it is a 
justification for the authoritarian state, it is Wittgenstein without the 
Tractatus,I112 and it is a demonstration of the connection between polit-
ics, law, and language. 
IG2 L. WrrTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS (1922). 
